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ABSTRACT 
Since its establishment, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed into a 
constitutionalist actor within and beyond the continent of Europe; a development that is in no 
small part due to judicial innovations, such as evolutive interpretation. Such innovation has 
resulted in a tension between the Court and the contracting parties that may conceivably call 
into question states’ diffuse support for the Court. We argue that this tension is addressed by 
the Court by means of a nascent model of judicial self-restraint discernible from the Court’s 
docket management, its cognisance of non-legal factors in particularly contentious cases, and 
its use of consensus-based interpretation. While arguably necessary, such a model is not cost-
free; rather, it may have implications for the quality of the Court’s decision-making and its 
standing in the eyes of other stakeholders, such as non-governmental organisations and 
complainants. 
KEYWORDS: European Court of Human Rights, judicial self-restraint, judicial innovation, 
human rights, European consensus, admissibility 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since its establishment in 1959, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has 
developed into a constitutionalist actor within and beyond the continent of Europe; a 
development that is in no small part due to judicial innovations, such as evolutive 
interpretation. However, this development presents the Court with both an opportunity and a 
challenge. In terms of opportunity, it enables the Court to secure the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) as a meaningful and effective instrument for the protection of rights 
through innovative tools. Thus, the Convention, as applied by the Court, remains capable of 
responding to contemporary rights challenges across the 47 member states of the Council of 
Europe. More challenging, however, is the task of keeping these states on board as this 
development is taking place, because judicial innovation within the Court has led to claims 
that the Convention is being interpreted out of its original meaning so that the Court is 
illegitimately expanding it in substance and form to oblige states to do things far outside of 
the contemplation of the original framers and the literal meaning of the text.
1
 
Judicial innovation, especially that leading to the evolution of the Convention, has 
resulted in a tension between the Court and the contracting parties; a tension that we argue is 
addressed by the Court through its docket management, its cognisance of non-legal factors in 
particularly contentious cases, and its use of consensus-based interpretation. In essence, we 
argue, the patterns of activity discernible in the Court under these brackets can be read as 
developing a nascent model of judicial self-restraint by the Court. Although these are 
mechanisms by which the risks and tensions emerging from judicial innovation are managed, 
we do not claim that such management is cost free. Rather, we draw out a number of 
                                                          
1
 The Contracting Parties have emphasised on a number occasions that the Court is a system of human rights 
protection which is subsidiary to the national system and then the Court should not go too far with innovations. 
As a result of this international pressure Protocol 15 will amend the preamble to the ECHR to include references 
to subsidiarity and margin of appreciation. See, Article 1 of Protocol No. 15 amending the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
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implications of this management for the Court in the eyes not only of contracting parties to 
the Convention but also of other important stakeholders such as rights-bearers and non-
governmental organisations (NGO) throughout Europe. 
In this article we first explore the ways in which judicial innovation within the Court 
has led contracting parties to question its legitimacy, with possible negative implications for 
diffuse support (i.e. support for the institution rather than for particular decisions it may 
make). The potential costs of a loss of diffuse support are such that, we argue, some 
mechanisms of managing judicial innovation are critical and, indeed, are discernible in the 
jurisprudence of the Court. In this respect we then consider the ways in which the Court’s 
docket management, cognisance of non-legal factors, and deployment of consensus decision-
making can all be read as management mechanisms even though, as interviews undertaken 
with current and former judges of the Court suggest, the Court may not be consciously 
managing this tension thus.  We then go on to consider the implications of this for the Court 
and most particularly for its jurisprudential development. Importantly, this article does not 
purport to question the legitimacy or desirability of judicial innovation (and especially 
evolution) per se in the Court. Rather we leave to one side these debates about judicial 
innovation (or activism, as it is sometimes called)
2
 and instead simply classify such 
innovation as part of the Court’s constitutionalist development of the Convention system. 
2. JUDICIAL INNOVATION IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
A. Judicial Innovation and Constitutionalism 
                                                          
2
 See, for example, confronting views of Lord Hoffmann in Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’ 
(2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 429 and the former President of the ECtHR, Luzius Wildhaber in Wildhaber, 
‘European Court of Human Rights’ (2002) 40 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 310. For more detailed 
discussion see, Dzehtsiarou, ‘European Consensus and the Evolutive Interpretation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1741. 
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The European Convention on Human Rights provides that it is the Court that has the ultimate 
interpretive authority as regards its provisions and their meaning.
3
 This interpretive power 
places the Court at the heart of the process of developing the Convention and elucidating on 
the precise nature of states’ obligations under it. In developing the Convention, the Court 
has—perhaps inevitably—been innovative, especially in terms of guiding the Convention’s 
evolution into a text and acquis with constitutionalist character within the European ordre 
public.  
By judicial innovation we do not only mean (explicit and implicit) adoption and 
application of evolutive interpretation in the case law of the Court, but also the Court’s 
approach to remedies,
4
 interim measures,
5
 procedure, and case management.
6
 These 
innovations have equipped the Court to cope with an increasing number of cases as the 
number of people and states in relation to which it can adjudicate has increased. Indeed, 
without these kinds of innovations it is difficult to see how the Court could effectively 
function, particularly as its constitutionalist character has evolved.  
Wildhaber claims that the Court is now firmly constitutionalist, a label that for him 
captures the following developments: the Court’s development from a bulwark against 
totalitarianism to something more akin to a domestic constitutional court adjudicating on 
quotidian issues of rights enforcement,
7
 its promotion of core constitutionalist values of 
democracy and human rights, and its use of constitutionalism as an analytical tool to 
                                                          
3
 ECHR, Article 32(1). 
4
 For instance the ECtHR began to deploy Article 46 to place legal obligations on the state to introduce a reform 
focusing on a particular structural problem in the judgment. For more information, see Leach, ‘No Longer 
Offering Fine Mantras to a Parched Child? The European Court's developing approach to remedies’ in Follesdal, 
Peters and Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe The European Court of Human Rights in National, European and 
Global Context (2013) 142. 
5
 After years of reluctance the Court acknowledged the binding force of interim measures in the case of 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey Application No 46827/99 and 46951/99, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 4 
February 2005. 
6
 Recent amendments in the Court’s working methods have allowed it to successfully tackle the backlog of 
inadmissible cases. 
7
 Wildhaber, ‘Rethinking the European Court of Human Rights’ in Christoffersen and Madsen (eds), The 
European Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (2011) 204 at 226-7. See also, Bates, The Evolution 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (2010) at 270. 
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distinguish between adjudicatory decisions and more serious constitutionalist questions.
8
 On 
this reading, and for our purposes, constitutionalism within the ECHR is both a process and a 
value. As a process it relates to the development of the Convention and the Court in line with 
core constitutionalist principles of respect for law, limitation of power, and accountability. As 
a value it expresses a commitment to supporting and implementing a pan-European 
framework within which those principles are operationalised. In both senses, the Court is a 
key constitutionalist actor, articulating common minimum standards that are the least one can 
expect to enjoy when within the jurisdiction of a member state by means of judicial 
innovation including evolutive interpretation.
9
 As Judge Rozakis writing extra-judicially has 
put it, the Court’s task is one of integration: of ‘attempting to create a coherent body of 
human rights rules that apply indiscriminately in the sphere of the legal relations of all of the 
states parties to the Convention’.10  
It seems inevitable that the fulfilment of this task would require some judicial 
innovation, particularly inasmuch as it involves ensuring the Convention is fit-for-purpose in 
the contemporary world and, concurrently, that states remain ‘on board’ as the Convention 
text is developed into broader principles of rights protection. That is, however, a challenging 
task, especially when it involves the Court in going beyond what the member states consider 
its legitimate boundaries to be, thus allegedly ‘distorting’ the plain meaning of the 
Convention.
11
 In such circumstances, states’ support for the Court can appear to begin to 
                                                          
8
 Wildhaber argues that this understanding of constitutionalist nature of the Court is the reaction to the 
overwhelming backlog of mostly inadmissible and repetitive applications. Wildhaber, supra n 7 at 226-7. See 
also, Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights. Achievements, Problems and Prospects (2006); de 
Londras, ‘Dual Functionality and the Persistent Frailty of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2013) 
European Human Rights Law Review 38, Greer and Wildhaber, ‘Revisiting the Debate about 
'Constitutionalising' the European Court of Human Rights’ (2012) 12 Human Rights Law Review 655. 
9
 de Londras, ‘International Human Rights Law and Constitutional Rights: In Favour of Synergy’ (2009) 9 
International Review of Constitutionalism 307.  
10
 Rozakis, ‘The European Judge as Comparatist’ (2005) 80 Tulane Law Review 272, cf Petkova, ‘Three Levels 
of Dialogue in Precedent Formation at the CJEU and ECtHR’ in Dzehtsiarou et al. (eds), Human Rights Law in 
Europe: The influence, overlaps and contradictions of the EU and the ECHR (2014) 73 at 73. 
11
 The Court has often resorted to activist reading of the Convention which was criticised by the judges, lawyers 
and states’ officials. The Court has effectively extended the ECHR by including right to access court to Article 6 
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decline, indicated by the emergence of negative language to describe judicial innovation: in 
such circumstances ‘development’ becomes ‘distortion’, ‘evolution’ becomes ‘activism’ 
(negatively understood), and the language of illegitimacy emerges. 
B. Legitimacy Deficit as a By-product of Constitutionalism 
Legitimacy is, of course, a complex concept, but for our purposes it can be described as 
respect and support for the Court emanating from stakeholders’ confidence that the Court will 
decide cases consistently, in a manner that respects the nature of both the Convention (as a 
human rights instrument) and its jurisdiction (as subsidiary and limited), and by reference to 
appropriate materials considered within a methodologically sound framework. This 
conception of legitimacy is clearly connected to diffuse support for the Court, i.e. to the 
building of a favourable disposition towards the Court per se so that stakeholders will 
concede its authority even to make decisions with which they disagree.
12
 To a large extent, 
however, whether or not someone considers that a decision or process adheres to these 
principles and is legitimate is bound up with their standpoint and desired outcome. The 
activist human rights campaigner might consider it wholly illegitimate for the Court to refuse 
to say, one way or another, whether there is a right to access an abortion in the absence of 
medical need under the Convention (for example), whereas a member state might say that the 
Convention purposefully fudges the matter (by the general nature of Article 2) and that it is a 
question of such moral disagreement that it is not for a subsidiary international human rights 
court to identify a minimum right by means of some kind of jurisprudential alchemy.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of the Convention (right to fair trial) in famous Golder v the United Kingdom. This activist decision-making was 
considered illegitimate even by some judges of the ECtHR. See, Golder v the United Kingdom Application No 
4451/70, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 21 February 1975 dissenting opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice. See also, 
Bates supra n 7 at 309-14. Among other examples it is worth mentioning spreading Article 8 of the Convention 
onto environmental issues (see, López Ostra v Spain Application No 16798/90, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 9 
December 1994 and Hatton and Others v the United Kingdom Application No 36022/97, Merits and Just 
Satisfaction, 8 July 2003) and Lord Hoffmann’s reaction to it (see, Hoffmann, supra n 2). 
12
 Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965). 
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It is the fact that there will sometimes be dissonances in what different stakeholders 
consider legitimate that makes innovation such a risk-laden business for the Court, especially 
in relation to these contentious issues.
13
  As the different stakeholders go, however, the Court 
has a particular need to maintain functioning relationships with contracting parties, i.e. states. 
This is because states are prominent actors in on-going reform efforts,
14
 central to the 
resourcing of the Court’s structure and institutional architecture, and critical actors in the 
processes of enforcement and execution of judgments. In this respect, individual states are 
both responsible for the execution of adverse judgments against them and play a more 
general role as members of the Committee of Minsters, which has a supervisory role in the 
execution of judgments.
15
 Taking this into account it is clear that Court has rather a lot to lose 
if states (and particularly high-compliance states) begin to withdraw support and/or seriously 
question its legitimacy. This is not to suggest that states would withdraw en masse or that the 
Court would somehow cease to function, but rather that a discourse of illegitimacy might 
emerge that has the potential to destabilise the Court and set the conditions for selective non-
compliance even by high compliance states.
16
  
The question of why the Contracting Parties comply with the judgments of the 
ECtHR is not a trivial one and has generated plentiful legal and political scholarship.
17
 It is 
                                                          
13
 Bodansky argues that ‘Governmental actors, for example, may have different views about legitimacy than 
members of civil society. They may put a much greater premium on sovereignty and consent, while civil society 
organizations may place much greater emphasis on participation and transparency. As a result, factors that may 
help to legitimise an institution in the eyes of non-state actors may help to delegitimise it in the eyes of state-
actors.’ Bodansky, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law’ (2008) 04-013 UGA Legal Studies 
Research Paper at 5-6, available at: ssrn.com/abstract=1033542 [last accessed 29 December 2014]. 
14
 See, the declarations adopted at Interlaken Izmir and Brighton on reform of the Court: Interlaken Declaration 
(19 February 2010), Izmir Declaration (27 April 2011) and Brighton Declaration (20 April 2012). 
15
 See, ECHR, Article 46. For a more detailed discussion of the role of the Committee of Ministers see, Çali and 
Koch, ‘Foxes Guarding the Foxes? The Peer review of Human Rights Judgments by the Committee of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe’ (2014) 14 Human Rights Law Review 301. 
16
 In this respect it is now seriously mooted in the United Kingdom that Parliament might decide on a case-by-
case basis whether to comply with decisions of the Court against the United Kingdom, rather than compliance 
being an expected part of domestic politics just as it is a clear expectation under Article 46(1) of the Convention 
itself.  
17
 See, for example, Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar 
Europe’ (2000) 54 International Organization 217, Helfer and Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication’ (1997) 107 Yale Law Journal 273, Dothan, ‘How International Tribunals Enhance 
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plausible to suggest that different Contracting Parties have different reasons for complying 
with the Court’s judgments and that these reasons sometimes might, in fact, have little or 
nothing to do with the content of the judgments themselves. They might, rather, relate to 
international pressure,
18
 the existence of specific sanctions,
19
 perceived independence of the 
tribunal,
20
 or national political context and state practice.
21
 However, the Court’s reasoning 
and its ‘behaviour’ can increase the likelihood that a judgment will be executed and accepted 
by the respondent state and thus increase the legitimacy of the judgments of the Court. 
Furthermore, mechanisms of reasoning can provide a public justification for decisions as to 
(non)compliance. This article analyses those aspects of the Court’s behaviour that are capable 
of enhancing legitimacy without putting the constitutionalist mission of the Court under peril.  
C. Judicial Innovations and Maintaining the Legitimacy of the Court 
Judicial innovation is a manifestation of the Court’s constitutionalist function which is 
capable of undermining the legitimacy of the Court in the eyes of states parties. At the core of 
states’ criticism of judicial innovation in the ECtHR is the claim that it engages the Court in 
going beyond its original remit and exceeding the jurisdiction conferred upon it by their 
original consent and, thus, is illegitimate. While more than fifty years of judicial operation in 
and jurisprudential development by the Strasbourg Court might suggest that original consent 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Their Legitimacy’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquires in Law 455, Lupu, ‘International Judicial Legitimacy: Lessons 
from National Courts’ (2013) 14 Theoretical Inquires in Law 437. 
18
 See, Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984), B 
Simmons, ‘Compliance with International agreements’ (1998) 1 Annual Review of Political Science 75. 
19
 Chayes and Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With International Regulatory Agreements (1998) at 
29-108. 
20
 Huneeus, ‘Compliance with Judgments and Decisions’ in Alter, Romano, Shany (eds), Oxford Handbook of 
International Adjudication (2014) 437 at 453. 
21
 Shany ‘Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-based Approach‘ (2012) 106 American 
Journal of International Law 225 at 261. Huneeus, supra n 20 at 354-7. 
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is of limited relevance to a consideration of the Court’s legitimacy,22 states continue to return 
to it (expressly or impliedly) in their critiques of the Court.
23
 
Of course it is important to acknowledge that, in the main, contracting parties 
comply with the Convention and execute judgments handed down against them because they 
recognise that this is part and parcel of being contracting parties to the Convention and 
members of a European community of states. In other words, contracting parties have agreed 
to be part of the system and through that agreement they have consented to the jurisdiction of 
the Court making its exercise of jurisdiction prima facie legitimate.
24
 Thus, states execute the 
Court’s judgments that are binding upon them (i.e. judgments in which the state is a 
respondent) at least partly because they agreed to do so. However, where the Court finds 
against a state through using innovative judicial techniques such as evolutive interpretation, 
states will sometimes dispute the legitimacy of this on the basis that it goes beyond their 
original consent.
25
 Even high compliance states such as the United Kingdom that generally 
exhibit a substantial amount of diffuse support for the Court can thus experience dips in this 
support in reaction to such decisions, as we have seen in the context of prisoner voting to 
which we return below. The Court cannot be blind to the risk that such reduction in support 
might lead to a deterioration of the vital relationship between it and member states; indeed, 
this seems to have led some judges to express concern about the potential costs of the Court 
                                                          
22
 Letsas, ‘The Truth in Autonomous Concepts: How to Interpret the ECHR’ (2004) 15 European Journal of 
International Law 304. 
23
 In 2009 Lord Hoffmann points out that ‘it would be valuable for the Council of Europe to continue to perform 
the functions originally envisaged in 1950, that is, drawing attention to violations of human rights in Member 
States and providing a forum in which they can be discussed’. Hoffmann, supra n 2 at 431. It would appear that 
this is primarily so when politicians speak about the legitimacy of the Court; see, Çali, Koch and Bruch ‘The 
Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights: The View from the Ground’ (2011), available at: 
ecthrproject.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/ecthrlegitimacyreport.pdf [last accessed 29 December 2014]. 
24
 Letsas has reconceptualised legitimacy based on consent into legitimacy based on commitment. While the two 
are similar the Letsas’ approach captures well the continuing nature of human rights conventions that do not 
intend to freeze the status quo at the moment of ratification but is effective only if reflects societal 
developments. Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a living instrument: its meaning and legitimacy’ in Follesdal, Peters and 
Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe: The European Court of Human Rights in a National, European and Global 
Context (2013) 106.  
25
 See, eg, David Cameron’s speech to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 25 January 2012, 
available at: www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-on-the-european-court-of-human-rights [last accessed 
29 December 2014]. 
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employing innovative techniques to too great a degree. For example, Judge Myjer (former 
ECtHR judge elected in respect of the Netherlands) said:  
I am one of those who believe that the biggest danger for the Court is that it 
turns into a purely academic church of human rights believers, who say that we 
preach the new Gospel of human rights….The point is that we have the 
Convention which was meant to say that what happened in WWII should not 
happen again. There are minimal values and rights that should be protected and 
if these minimal rights are violated, we give citizens the right to complain to an 
international court. I am very much in favour of a rather restrictive approach of 
the Court and we should take care to not overestimate ourselves.
26
 
In our view the danger that Judge Myjer refers to is properly seen as the cost of a reduction in 
diffuse support from contracting parties, which would hamper the Court in its attempts to be 
innovative in the development of the Convention so that it can act effectively as a 
constitutionalist instrument. We claim that the management of the Court’s docket, being 
cognisant of non-legal factors, and the deployment of ‘consensus’ decision-making by the 
Court are all techniques deployed in order to effectively manage the tension that emerges 
from judicial innovation in the Court. It is to these that we now turn. 
3. MANAGEMENT OF THE COURT’S DOCKET 
All courts engage in docket management processes of some kind, and judges are often to the 
forefront of this in their making of threshold decisions as to whether or not a case is to be 
heard at all. It has long been accepted that the management of cases—or the management of 
the list or the docket—is not a neutral exercise but rather has the capacity to shape a Court’s 
work in a substantive way.
27
 This is perhaps especially so in systems where the court in 
                                                          
26
 Dzehtsiarou, Interview with Judge of the ECtHR Egbert Myjer (2009).  
27
 See, Resnik, ‘Managerial Judges’ (1982) 96 Harvard Law Review 374. 
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question has a fairly sweeping capacity to decide on what it will hear, either through 
something like the selective jurisdiction of the US and UK Supreme Courts or, as in the case 
of the ECtHR, through the application of admissibility rules in a non-bureaucratic manner.
28
 
In addition, the ECtHR has a further discretion which is as to whether or not to convene the 
Grand Chamber to hear a case and, in so doing, whether to facilitate a decision emanating 
from the most authoritative formation of the Court. In deciding on admissibility and on 
convening the Grand Chamber, the ECtHR is determining to some extent the canvas that it 
will paint on; it is deciding whether to take cases that are high risk from the perspective of 
judicial innovation. Docket management is, then, an important tool for the ECtHR in 
managing the tension between innovation and support. 
A. Admissibility 
The ECtHR has a wide-ranging set of admissibility rules, not only for the purposes of making 
its workload manageable but also in recognition of the Court’s nature as a subsidiary court. 
These range from what might appear to be relatively innocuous admissibility requirements 
(such as the requirement that the complaint not be anonymous,
29
 or the six-month time 
limit
30
) to those that are more akin to rules allowing proxy judgment on the merits (perhaps 
most notably the requirement that an application should not be manifestly ill-founded).
31
 
Although sometimes classed as a merely bureaucratic process, Andrew Tickell has 
persuasively argued that the administration of these admissibility criteria by the Court is in 
fact often an exercise of substantive judgement.
32
 This reflects the fact that, in applying its 
admissibility rules, the Court has always exercised a substantial amount of flexibility, even in 
                                                          
28
 On the applicability of admissibility rules in bureaucratic v substantive judgement manners see, Tickell 
‘Dismantling the Iron-Cage: the Discursive Persistence and Legal Failure of a “Bureaucratic Rational” 
Construction of the Admissibility Decision-Making of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 12 German 
Law Journal 1786, drawing on Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice: Managin Social Security Disability Claims 
(1985). 
29
 ECHR, Article 35(2)(a). 
30
 ECHR, Article 35(1). 
31
 ECHR, Article 35(3)(a). 
32
 Ibid. 
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respect of what might appear to be the most straightforward of rules.
33
 For example the Court 
was able to determine admissibility at least partially by reference to factors such as the 
perceived severity of the alleged violation which suggests its capacity to use admissibility as 
a management tool. Rules of admissibility can be disregarded if a constitutionalist issue is at 
stake. In Ilhan v Turkey, for instance, the ECtHR stated that ‘the rules of admissibility must be 
applied with some degree of flexibility and without excessive formalism. Regard must also be had to 
the object and purpose of those rules and of the Convention generally, which, as a treaty for the 
collective enforcement of human rights and fundamental freedoms, must be interpreted and applied so 
as to make its safeguards practical and effective’.
34
  
The potential for tension management through admissibility decisions has arguably 
been enhanced by the introduction of new rules with a focus on the nature of significance of 
the alleged violation, namely the adjustment of Article 35(3)(b) by Protocol No 14. 
Following that adjustment, Article 35(3)(b) now reads 
The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted 
under Article 34 if it considers that: 
... 
(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for 
human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an 
examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be 
rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic 
tribunal.
35
 
                                                          
33
 For example 6-months (soon to be 4-months) rule or prohibition of anonymity.  
34
 İlhan v Turkey Application No 22277/93, Merits and Just Satisfaction, 27 June 2000, at para 51.  
35
 The Brighton Declaration proposes amendment of this Article to remove the phrase ‘and provided that no 
case... tribunal’; Brighton Declaration, supra n 14 at para 15. 
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On the face of it, this appears to be a criterion that is intended to allow the Court to be more 
selective by filtering out less important cases (with importance being determined by using 
significance of disadvantage as a proxy), thus allowing it to focus on cases that might be said 
to have more potential for development of the Convention.
36
  Whenever the question of 
significant disadvantage is considered by the Court
37
 as a matter of admissibility an 
underlying claim is being made that reflects the tension that we are concerned with here. The 
implicit claim is either (i) that the disadvantage suffered is so significant that a refusal to hear 
the case when it is otherwise inadmissible would be unjustifiable on constitutionalist grounds, 
even if its resolution requires judicial innovation and (ii) that the disadvantage suffered is so 
insignificant (thus the case does not raise ‘real’ constitutionalist questions) that even 
compliance with the other admissibility grounds ought not to be sufficient for the Court--
overburdened and in need of rationalising its workload as it is--to agree to hear it.
38
 
Moreover, the Convention puts an obligation on the Court to consider the consequences for 
the constitutionalist development of the Convention of declaring the case inadmissible due to 
there being no significant disadvantage. Pursuant to Article 35, the ECtHR should not deploy 
this admissibility criterion if respect for human rights requires examination of the case. Thus, 
it seems that if the issue is of prima facie constitutionalist importance, lack of significant 
disadvantage becomes irrelevant. This, of course, raises the question of what is meant by the 
phrase ‘significant disadvantage’. The Court summarised its understanding of this criteria in 
Shefer as follows: 
                                                          
36
 The history of the introduction of this new criterion points to its attempt to achieve all of these things: Buyse, 
‘Significantly Insignificant? The Life in the Margins of the Admissibility Criterion in Article 35 § 3 (b) ECHR’ 
in McGonigle Leyh et al. (eds), The realization of human rights: when theory meets practice. Studies in honour 
of Leo Zwaak (2013), available at: ssrn.com/abstract=2244283 [last accessed 29 December 2014]. Moreover, 
this capacity will be furthered by Protocol 15 which will remove one of the restrictions from Article 35(3)(b) in 
its Article 15, which will allow the Court to declare cases inadmissible due to lack of significant disadvantage 
even if such case ‘has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal’. 
37
 This new admissibility criterion can be raised by a respondent government or by the Court on its own motion 
(Ionescu v Romania Application No 36659/04, Admissibility, 1 June 2010). 
38
 This is also suggested by the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 (CETS No. 194), at para 77. 
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The general principle de minimis non curat praetor underlies the logic of 
Article 35 § 3 (b), which strives to warrant consideration by an international 
court of only those cases where violation of a right has reached a minimum 
level of severity. Violations which are purely technical and insignificant 
outside a formalistic framework do not merit European supervision...
39
 
Not only does this quotation from Shefer state that merely technical violations (a 
characterisation that is not neither self-explanatory nor objectively determinable) ‘do not 
merit’ the attention of the Court, but it suggests that considering such violations would be 
illegitimate by reference to the Court’s subsidiary character. The Court’s attention and 
innovative capacities are to be left for more ‘significant’ matters than these.  
B. Hearing a Case in the Grand Chamber 
Unlike admissibility criteria that protect the court from low importance claims but can be 
disregarded if there is a constitutionalist issue at stake, transfer of the case to the Grand 
Chamber is a mechanism of highlighting legal disputes that are considered to be of particular 
importance by the Court. The Grand Chamber is the largest formation of the Court, 
comprising seventeen judges including the President and Vice-Presidents of the Court and 
Presidents of the Sections.
40
 It enjoys a very selective jurisdiction, making it a key instrument 
for use by the Court in selecting venues for innovation to establish, promote and emphasise 
constitutionalist values,
41
 as illustrated by how a case comes to be heard by the Grand 
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40
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Chamber. This happens either by relinquishment to the Grand Chamber under Article 30, or 
by a referral following a decision in a Chamber under Article 43.
42
   
Relinquishment takes place without any substantial involvement of the parties to the 
case; rather whether or not the matter in hand ought to be determined by the Grand Chamber 
is decided by the judges of the Chamber considering the case. At present, the parties to the 
case have a veto power over relinquishment, however that will be abolished with the coming 
into force of Protocol 15.
43
 Then the Chambers will be able to relinquish any case to the 
Grand Chamber regardless of the preferences of the parties involved.  
Referral to the Grand Chamber is somewhat more participatory, although the 
decision still lies with the Court itself. Here, a party to a case can refer it to the Grand 
Chamber once the original decision has been made in a Chamber of seven judges. A panel of 
five senior judges of the ECtHR then decides on the referral request.
44
 As a general trend, the 
success rate of such requests is very low: by means of example, in 2012 less than 4% of them 
were successful in having the case referred.
45
 Generally speaking  only a small number of 
cases are successfully referred to the Grand Chamber in a year, and the panel does not 
provide reasons for rejection. Taking into account the broadly defined criteria for referral and 
very low success rate out of a significant number of requests,
46
 one can argue that here, as 
well as in cases of relinquishment, the Court ultimately controls the Grand Chamber docket 
by selecting only exceptional cases for consideration. These cases then become candidates for 
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judicial innovation, especially where they involve the Grand Chamber in significantly 
developing the previous jurisprudence of the Court on a particular matter (including 
developing its own previous position on an issue
47
). Although no reasons are given in 
individual cases for rejection or acceptance of a referral request, the Court did release a 
practice note in 2011 outlining that ‘[c]ases that will be sent to the Grand Chamber are likely 
to’ be (a) cases affecting case-law consistency, (b) cases which may be suitable for 
development of the case law, (c) cases suitable for clarifying principles from existing case 
law, (d) cases in which the Grand Chamber might re-examine a jurisprudential development 
endorsed by the Chamber, (e) cases concerning ‘new’ issues, (f) cases raising a ‘serious issue 
of general importance’, and (g) ‘high-profile’ cases.48 This clearly suggests that the 
constitutionalist opportunity—and space for judicial innovation—that a case presents are 
relevant to decision as to whether or not to accept the request for referral and, thus, to allow 
the Grand Chamber to decide on the case. 
The Court must be particularly cautious in opening up space for judicial innovation 
in the Grand Chamber because decisions of the Grand Chamber carry a particular weight 
within the Convention system, so that innovation at that level can attract particular criticism 
from states. This is so because decisions of the Grand Chamber are the Court’s final word on 
the issue; the dispute is not subject to any futher appeal.
49
 This partially explains the 
configuration of the Grand Chamber, which is the second important factor here. As noted 
above, the Grand Chamber consists of seventeen judges including the President and Vice-
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Presidents of the Court and Presidents of the Sections meaning that,
50
 when compared with 
Chambers of seven judges,
51
 it arguably offers a more authoritative decision of an issue. 
Third, the selection of cases is made according to their importance to human rights protection 
and to the interpretation of the Convention or when there is a possibility that a previous 
precedent of the Court will be overruled.
52
 These criteria are broad and, as outlined above, the 
cases are selected by the judges exercising their discretionary powers. Thus, the selection of 
cases for the Grand Chamber seems to reflect what the judges think the truly important 
constitutionalist human rights issues in Europe are at the material time so that judicial 
innovation occurs in cases that the Court considers require its attention, in spite of the 
potential associated legitimacy costs. Fourth, the Grand Chamber tends to deliver no more 
than 30 judgments per year meaning that it is quite possible to keep track of these 
judgments
53
 which are usually better covered in the media than the large number of decisions 
emanating from the Chambers.  
Thus, the Court can emphasise a particular issue by promoting a case to the Grand 
Chamber level. Moreover, the Court executes control over the Grand Chamber docket and 
whether a case ends up in the Grand Chamber is not heavily dependent on the will of the 
parties involved but rather, we contend, on the Court’s instinct as to whether a Grand 
Chamber decision developing the Convention jurisprudence on the matter at hand is 
sufficiently necessary and appropriate to bear the cost of opening up space for judicial 
innovation on the matter. 
4. COGNISANCE OF NON-LEGAL FACTORS 
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Although independent,
54
 courts are not entirely insulated from the broader political context in 
which they operate. Indeed some have even gone so far as to say that courts are properly 
understood as political actors.
55
 However, one does not have to subscribe to this view to see 
that there is a trend of courts taking non-legal factors into account in their decision-making. 
Whether this is acceptable or not is, of course, a matter of contention and, as with many 
things, depends to a large extent on the standpoint and interests of the person making the 
assessment. The ECtHR has escaped neither the tendency to be cognisant of non-legal 
factors
56
 nor the criticism this can elicit from scholars and activists.
57
 However, the capacity 
and willingness of the Court to take at least some account of broader issues of context is 
likely to feed into states’ assessment of decisions reached through judicial innovation and, 
consequently, diffuse support for the Court. Indeed, the call in the Interlaken Declaration for 
the Court to ‘take fully into account its subsidiary role in the interpretation and application of 
the Convention’58 contains within it an implicit appeal for such cognisance, which appears to 
be granted in situations where the Court considers that there is an especially notable strength 
of feeling either within the respondent state or across member states, and in relation to issues 
where states have particularly sovereigntist (and anti-internationalist) inclinations such as 
national security. 
A. Strength of Domestic or International Feeling 
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In some, relatively limited, cases the Court appears to be willing to allow an apparent 
strength of feeling as to a particular issue to influence its decision as to the compatibility of 
the impugned state action with the Convention, often through the innovative development of 
pre-existing doctrines to allow for such views to be effectively considered. This is especially 
the case where the issue at hand is said to reflect an important element of national identity. 
Thus, in Leyla Sahin v Turkey the Court found that prohibiting the wearing of Islamic 
headdress in universities was justifiable and not a violation of Article 9 by reference to the 
secular constitutional identity of the state.
59
 In somewhat less explicit ways, the decisions of 
Lautsi v Italy
60
 (on the display of crucifixes in state school classrooms) and A, B and C v 
Ireland
61
 (relating to the availability of abortion) both illustrate the court’s sensitivity to the 
respondent state’s claims as to the strength of national feeling or the national narrative around 
the issue at hand. In both cases there seems to have been an unwillingness to innovate and 
develop existing jurisprudence in order to push a constitutionalist line into areas in which the 
respondent states had entrenched positions, determined by apparent national narratives and 
relating to questions of moral contestation about religion in the public sphere and 
reproductive autonomy. This unwillingness is not explicable by the disadvantage experienced 
by the complainants being in some way ‘insignificant’ by reference to either objective or 
subjective factors,
62
 but rather it seems to us by a tacit acceptance that there are some fields in 
which a contracting party is likely to find judicial innovation leading to constitutionalist 
intervention by Strasbourg to be illegitimate and, as a result, into which the Court will be 
reluctant to tread. In the case of A, B and C v Ireland this resulted in the development by the 
Court of a doctrine of ‘trumping internal consensus’ which allows for a respondent state to 
claim that, notwithstanding the existence of European consensus on a matter, an internal 
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(domestic) consensus exists and can be verified within the respondent state that is sufficient 
to justify divergence from, and therefore trumps, the identified European consensus.
63
  
Where the Court receives an indication that a number of states across the Council of 
Europe are inclined towards a particular outcome in a case that is before it this can also act as 
a non-legal factor that influences the decision reached and acts as a brake on innovation. 
Thus, multiple interventions
64
 by contracting parties that present a united (or near united) 
front to the Court of the states’ desired outcome can be influential. Take, for example, the 
judgment in Lautsi v Italy.
65
 In this case the Court was called to decide whether the mandated 
display of crucifixes in Italian state schools violated religious freedom under Article 9. The 
Chamber found a violation; a decision that was poorly received
66
 and referred to the Grand 
Chamber. Ten states—almost a quarter of the membership of the Council of Europe—
intervened to argue that no violation ought to be found and the Grand Chamber overruled the 
Chamber’s judgment. There had been, it held, no violation of Article 9. Of course, one cannot 
definitively claim that the mass of intervening states determined the outcome; nor is that our 
argument. However, it is too much to suggest that the mass of interveners did not indicate to 
the Court the disappointment with which a contrary finding would be received by these states 
so that judicial innovation might have been reined in. Indeed, the impact that third party 
submissions have on the Court’s decision-making has been explored elsewhere. Petkova 
argues that ‘at least in the area of qualified rights, it appears that the Court is more likely to 
establish or override its own precedents when transnational actors are also inclined to such 
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developments. Conversely, the ECHR has hesitated to do so and has preserved the status quo 
in cases where the amici briefs significantly diverge’.67 Interestingly all third party 
submissions by states in this case were in favour of a finding of ‘no violation’, while the 
NGOs’ submissions were diverse (although the majority supported finding a violation of 
Article 9). If Petkova’s suggestion is correct, then the Court may have been influenced by the 
unanimous submission supporting the no-violation outcome from the contracting parties and 
thus considered that this was a case in which a restrained approach that would not impact 
negatively on states’ diffuse support was appropriate. Even if levels of interest demonstrated 
through intervention do not influence the final outcome of a case, a statistical analysis of 
referral requests to the Grand Chamber since 2011 (when press releases about panel decisions 
began to be published) suggests that third party intervention by other states or NGOs 
correlates with a much higher referral acceptance rate (c. 19%) than without (5.16%).
68
 
This is not to suggest that the Court will always bend to the will of states or restrain 
itself simply because of the strength of feeling on behalf of the respondent state. This is 
illustrated by the emergence in recent years of prisoner voting as an important stress point 
between the Court and the UK following Hirst (No 2) v the UK.
69
 In Hirst the Court found 
that the UK’s absolute ban on prisoners voting violates the Convention; a finding that has met 
with staunch resistance at the domestic level. The UK is not the only European state to ban 
prisoners from voting, but as Tom Zwart has observed ‘the Court used the Hirst case against 
the UK, a high compliance State, as a vehicle for establishing that such a ban is contrary to 
the Convention’.70 Although Hirst has not yet resulted in domestic change the principles 
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established there have been applied in later cases against other contracting parties,
71
 
reinforcing the innovation introduced in Hirst. As regards the relationship between the UK 
and the ECtHR, however, Hirst has been costly; political actors have not been shy in using it 
as a vehicle for questioning the legitimacy of the Court or even the desirability of the UK 
remaining as a contracting party to the Convention, indicating a reduction in diffuse support 
at least at a rhetorical level. It is difficult to suppose that this has not had some influence on 
recent cases. In spite of the controversial decision in Vinter and others v the UK
72
 (finding 
that life sentences without the possibility of parole violate the Convention), we have begun to 
see the Court appearing to take domestic sensitivities in the UK into account in other 
controversial cases in a manner that Helen Fenwick argues amounts to appeasement.
73
 Three 
cases seem to suggest this.  
In Abu Hamsa,
74
 Austin
75
 and Animal Defenders
76
 we see unexpected decisions that 
seem to favour the UK’s desired approach, even in the face of seemingly clear case law to the 
contrary. Thus, in Animal Defenders the European Court of Human Rights found that the ban 
on political advertising in the UK did not violate Article 10, even though it had found a 
violation in the almost identical case of VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v Switzerland. This 
did not go unnoticed by the dissenting judges, who wrote: 
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We are particularly struck by the fact that when one compares the outcome in 
this case with the outcome in the case of VgT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v 
Switzerland the almost inescapable conclusion must be that an essentially 
identical ‘general prohibition’ on ‘political advertising’ – sections 321(2) and 
(3) of the 2003 Act in this case and sections 18 and 15 of the Federal Radio and 
Television Act and the Radio and Television Ordinance respectively in VgT – 
is not necessary in Swiss democratic society, but is proportionate and a fortiori 
necessary in the democratic society of the United Kingdom. We find it 
extremely difficult to understand this double standard within the context of a 
Convention whose minimum standards should be equally applicable 
throughout all the States parties to it.
77
 
What this suggests, at the very least, is that the ECtHR is acutely aware of the political 
context in which its decisions are made and, indeed, of the extent to which it is on safe or 
shaky ground in the eyes of the relevant member state; considerations that become even more 
acute in situations in which sovereigntist urges might be said to run high. Indeed, the most 
recent prisoners’ voting rights case tends to reinforce this finding. While the Court 
maintained its position that the UK violates the Convention through its absolute ban on 
prisoners voting in the case of Firth and Others v United Kingdom,
78
 it also held that a 
declaration of violation was just satisfaction for non-pecuniary damage so that compensation 
need not be paid by the respondent state found to be in violation. 
B. Managing Sovereigntist Inclinations 
While issues that go to a state’s perceived identity bring about a reluctance to submit to 
international supervision on the part of states, matters that are seen to have existential 
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implications for the state can draw out sovereigntist inclinations. In other words, in relation to 
these issues states can feel not only inclined but also justified in distancing themselves from 
international supervision and may instead concentrate on engaging with and within their 
domestic legal systems, making international courts’ supervision of these issues particularly 
difficult. This is clear from a consideration of the ECtHR’s treatment of national security 
cases and, in particular, its apparent willingness to treat different states somewhat differently 
in this context. Although most of the cases considered here are drawn from the current 
counter-terrorist context, this is not a uniquely post-9/11 phenomenon. Rather, this trend has 
arguably been discernible since the Greek Case
79
 in which the Commission, for the first and 
only time, rejected a government’s decision that an emergency within the meaning of Article 
15 existed. When seen in the light of the many other cases in which such a declaration was 
accepted by the Court,
80
 often in what were questionable circumstances,
81
 it becomes at least 
arguable that this had more than a little to do with the fact that the government in Greece at 
the time comprised a military junta and that the Court is more trusting of such (ultimately 
political) determinations where they emanate from democratically elected governments.
82
 Of 
course, the different treatment of Greece when compared to other states at the time has itself 
been identified as undermining the legitimacy of the Court by a number of scholars,
83
 and if a 
wide-scale difference of treatment between states were to be clearly and publicly evident that 
would undoubtedly undermine the Court’s legitimacy further. Although it is difficult to 
pinpoint analogous cases in contemporary jurisprudence, there are some interesting contrasts 
that can be identified between how different states seem to be treated. 
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Take, for example, engagement with different states in relation to the (regular or 
irregular) expulsion of suspected terrorists. The United Kingdom has long been engaged in an 
attempt to somehow recalibrate the non refoulement standard as applied in Chahal when it 
comes to security risks.
84
 Although it did not succeed in having Chahal substantively revised 
through its intervention into Saadi v Italy,
85
 the UK has engaged effectively in litigation to 
ensure that states can deport individuals to other states with questionable human rights 
records subject to diplomatic assurances or memoranda of understanding.
86
 In spite of the fact 
that experts such as the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Torture87 have unequivocally 
condemned these assurances, the Court has continued to hold that deportation pursuant to 
such assurances is permissible provided a number of (not particularly onerous) standards are 
met in relation to them.
88
 Once the relevant assurance is secured the suspect can be deported 
and, even if then subjected to torture or to an unfair trial, the sending state is not responsible. 
Although (as the Abu Qatada saga illustrates) even this fairly minimal standard has 
sometimes frustrated the UK’s efforts, it is as much as has been demanded by the Court. 
Thus, the Court has not laid down absolute standards prohibiting the deportation of such 
suspects to states of this kind; rather it has accommodated the UK’s desire for a deportation-
heavy approach to counter-terrorism, even in the absence of an Article 15 emergency.
89
  
Similarly, the ECtHR has approved of closed materials proceedings in the security 
context provided only that the ‘gist’ (whatever that might be) of the case against the suspect 
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is revealed to him, in a substantial adjustment of what might be considered to be a basic tenet 
of a fair trial (the right to answer the case against one
90
), again without the need for an Article 
15 declaration of emergency.
91
 In respect of the United Kingdom, then, there has been what 
seems to be a high level of tolerance for repressive counter-terrorist measures introduced and 
applied in a time of so-called ‘normalcy’.92 In contrast, we might note the Court’s 
unequivocal condemnation of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’s involvement in 
extraordinary rendition in the case of El-Masri.
93
 Here, no tolerance whatsoever was 
displayed for the apparent exigencies of the situation. We do not mean to suggest that 
deportation, special advocates or ‘gisting’ are the same as extraordinary rendition, but there 
can be implications for the same kinds of rights (freedom from torture, right to a fair trial, 
right to be free from arbitrary deprivations of liberty) in both cases. In spite of this, the Court 
displays markedly different approaches.  
Although not expressly made out in the judgments, non-legal factors seem likely to 
play a role in the Court’s decision-making processes in cases of such heightened sensitivity. 
The UK was, and is, a leading state in contemporary counter-terrorism, and rhetorical 
presentation of human rights as potential interferences with security was clear from the UK’s 
leadership early on in the post-9/11 milieu.
94
 The UK is also a significant actor within the 
Council of Europe so that its attitudes towards the ECtHR and perceptions of its legitimacy 
are important and influential for the Court on an institutional level. As one of the founders of 
the Convention and a significant actor in its development, the marked withdrawal of diffuse 
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suport from the UK owing to a perception of the Court’s reduced legitimacy could have 
serious consequences, especially in a high-stakes context such as counter-terrorism. With this 
in mind, and taking into account the fact that the UK is what Dothan calls a ‘high reputation 
state’ in terms of human rights generally (although perhaps not in the counter-terrorist 
context in particular), a relatively limited amount of judicial innovation by the Court is 
politically possible in the counter-terrorist context.
95
 Macedonia, in contrast, is in nothing like 
as powerful a position; here there was more scope for muscularity in relation to counter-
terrorism and for a clear standard to be established relating to a state’s involvement with the 
extraordinary rendition programme. After that case there was relatively little risk for  the 
Court in concretising those standards in similar cases that came before it against Poland;
96
 the 
constitutionalist heavy-lifting had been done by means of judicial innovation in the lower risk 
context of El-Masri.  
This analysis may seem to set up a paradoxical claim: that the Court can ‘use’ the 
UK to set certain standards because it is a high reputation and high compliance state while at 
the same time being keen to exercise more self-restraint and not going too far in the cases 
against the UK. This simply reflects the fact that the subject matter and timing of a judgment 
can be important factors to be taken into account by the Court, as well as the nature of the 
respondent state.  
As the UK is a high reputation state, the Court seems understandably anxious to 
keep it on board to ensure that it remains the pathway for certain judicial innovations. The 
UK is arguably likely to comply, even with adverse judgments.
97
 This, then, reduces the risk 
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associated with handing down such judgments and allows for the development of a situation 
in which costs of non-compliance became high because an expectation would develop that 
judgments would be complied with. This is not to suggest that the UK or other high 
reputation states would inevitably comply, or would do so ungrudgingly, for this is subject to 
the third factor that must be borne in mind: the nature of the issue at hand. There will 
inevitably be issues on which a state holds such a particularly firm view that the risk of being 
innovative is especially significant, as we have seen above. In others, judicial innovation may 
seem a less costly exercise. 
5. CONSENSUS DECISION-MAKING 
Consensus decision-making by the ECtHR is a further mechanism by which the Court 
manages judicial innovation, in this case by means of the interpretive approach it deploys. 
This relates to the use by the Court of a determination of so-called ‘consensus’, often between 
member states but also sometimes on a more international level, as to a particular issue in 
order to determine whether or not the Convention can be interpreted as providing the 
protection claimed.
98
 Consensus decision-making is a mechanism of managing judicial 
innovation when it is used by the Court in an attempt to reconcile evolution of the 
Convention through judicial innovation with original consent.
99
  In these cases, the reasoning 
of the Court draws on the experiences and approaches of contracting parties and their 
counterparts, as well as on fields of specialised knowledge at times, in order to develop the 
content and meaning of Convention provisions. Thus, the Court tries to enhance its 
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legitimacy through deployment of European consensus
100
 in the course of developing 
Convention law. 
As considered above, original consent is often conceptualised as a main source of 
legitimacy in the areas of international law
101
 and international adjudication.
102
 In other 
words, a state will accept an international standard’s bindingness or the decision of an 
international court or tribunal because it has consented (either through ratification of a treaty 
or by not mounting consistent objection to custom) to being thus bound. However, a 
conception of original consent that meant that states were bound only to what the law was—
and was understood to be—at the time of ratification would stymie the development of the 
international legal system; it would suggest in a narrowly construed way that only decisions 
that could have been anticipated by the originators of the system in question can be 
considered legitimate.
103
  The ECtHR does not take an originalist approach to the 
Convention. Rather, recognising its special character as a human rights treaty
104
 and its 
purpose of securing effective rights protection, it has long committed to evolutive 
interpretation taking social and legal developments into account. A few examples serve to 
illustrate this point. 
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In Ünal Tekeli v Turkey the Court was called upon to decide whether a provision of 
Turkish legislation preventing women from keeping their maiden names after getting married 
violates Article 8, taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. The Court found a 
violation in this case after stating that ‘[o]f the member states of the Council of Europe 
Turkey is the only country which legally imposes – even where the couple prefers an 
alternative arrangement – the husband’s name as the couple’s surname and thus the automatic 
loss of the woman’s own surname on her marriage’.105 It is undeniable that equality of sexes 
is an important constitutionalist principle and value of the Convention; consensus decision 
making in this case offered an avenue for promoting this principle. Other constitutional 
principles were set and supported by consensus in such cases as Tănase v Moldova106 where 
the Court found a violation of passive electoral rights of people with dual citizenship, and in 
Republican Party of Russia v Russia
107
 in which the Court found consensus against 
prohibition of regional parties and found a violation of the Convention in this case.  
While these are examples of cases where consensus has been the basis for judicial 
innovation, consensus—or rather the lack thereof—has also formed the basis for judicial self-
restraint. SH and others v Austria
108
 provides an excellent example, although it is by no 
means the only one.
109
 SH concerned the use of donor sperm and eggs for in vitro 
fertilisation, which is forbidden by Austrian law. The First Section had held that this violated 
Article 8 of the Convention when read in conjunction with Article 14; but the Grand 
Chamber reversed this decision, making it quite clear that one of the major argumentative 
rationales for doing so was the lack of a consensus on the matter. Noting that the question 
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before it raised ‘sensitive moral and ethical issues’110 on which ‘there is not yet clear 
common ground amongst the member States’,111 the Court found that there was no violation 
as there was no European consensus to support such a conclusion. This is notwithstanding the 
point that, in fact, there is an emerging consensus permitting the use of donor sperm, in 
particular, for in vitro fertilisation. The Court, however, held that this ‘emerging consensus is 
not, however, based on settled and long-standing principles established in the law of the 
member States but rather reflects a stage of development within a particularly dynamic field 
of law and does not decisively narrow the margin of appreciation of the State’;112 thus it was 
not sufficient as a basis to support the evolutive step the First Section had taken. Here, then, 
the Court used consensus decision-making to support a self-restrained decision, as indeed it 
did in A, B & C v Ireland as discussed earlier. SH and others v Austria also suggests a 
consciousness on the part of the Court around exercising self-restraint in this way, with the 
Court noting that its task, especially in morally sensitive areas, ‘is not to substitute itself for 
the competent national authorities in determining the most appropriate policy for regulating 
matters of artificial procreation’.113 
Thus, the consensus approach is incremental but also sometimes uneven; a point we 
return to below. However, as an approach to the interpretation of the Convention it clever 
allows the Court to both put into action the mandate from the preamble to the Convention to 
achieve greater unity between the Convention’s members by the development of common 
understandings as rights, and enables a (sometimes tenuous) tethering of evolution to original 
consent. In this way, the legitimacy questions that arise from judicial innovation can be 
answered while constitutionalism is nurtured.  
6. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF MANAGING JUDICIAL INNOVATION 
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We have outlined above three trends that we argue can be read as managing judicial 
innovation in the European Court of Human Rights, and which taken together constitute a 
nascent model of judicial self-restraint. If this reading is accurate it has a number of 
implications of relevance to both the development of the Convention itself and the 
relationship between the Court and other stakeholders.  
If, as we suggest above, the Court sometimes takes cognisance of non-legal factors 
including the possible implications for its own position of taking an innovative approach to a 
question before it, it may well be susceptible to capture. In other words, there is a possibility 
that in either deciding whether to hear the case at all or in reaching its final decision on a case 
the Court may take into account contracting parties’ reactions and allow this to influence the 
outcome unduly. Although this is and ought to be of concern, it is also part and parcel of the 
Court’s subsidiary character.114 Subsidiary courts are different, by their very nature, than are 
domestic apex courts; they step in to adjudicate in situations where the domestic system—
which is the primary adjudicatory mechanism—has already dealt with a matter in some way. 
In this respect subsidiary courts have a limited jurisdiction and might be said to be expected 
to take states’ reactions into account. This is due not only to the precarious nature of 
subsidiary courts and their reliance on states, but also the design of international courts. It is 
important to say that vulnerability or susceptibility to capture does not mean that the Court 
never makes decisions that are unpopular with respondent states; indeed, we know that this is 
absolutely not the case. It means, rather, that such decisions are not taken lightly or that the 
Court is not unaware of the possible implications of its decisions so that they are carefully 
considered and weighed. 
This suggests that cases where judicial innovation is on display and, particularly, 
where the Convention has been developed raise questions or issues that the Court considers to 
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be of sufficient constitutionalist significance to bear the costs of innovation. In all likelihood 
these are not trivial matters, but rather ones that are seen as implicating important questions 
of rights, participation and democratic values. This can help to explain why the Court may 
appear to ‘antagonise’ states in relation to matters that the states in question have already set 
out a quite clear stall on. Take, for example, prisoner voting. One might wonder why the 
ECtHR has, in at least some people’s eyes, decided to ‘pick a fight’ with the UK government 
on this issue, particularly as finding that blanket bans on prisoner voting constituted a 
violation required some innovation in relation to the text of the Convention. The answer, it 
seems to us, must lie in the Court’s conviction that voting is a key element of democratic 
participation so that—while the right to vote can be curtailed—any restriction on it must be 
justified by reference to the circumstances and that imprisonment does not, per se, suffice in 
this respect. The very fact that the Court has remained resolute in its core claim from Hirst 
(that voting rights cannot be automatically stripped from all those incarcerated), even while 
allowing for very significant restrictions in Scoppola (No 3),
115
 implicitly indicates that it 
considers voting to be a matter of sufficient constitutionalist importance to risk damaging the 
relationship with the UK. This ought, ideally, to trigger reflection in the domestic system 
about the rationales for and justifiability of the absolute ban, recognising that associated costs 
mean the Court is unlikely to risk innovation in a trivial matter. Thus, some relationship 
between degrees of innovation and constitutionalist significance might be discernible. 
This, of course, is not unproblematic for it suggests also an inverse relationship 
whereby issues in relation to which little innovation has been forthcoming are implicitly 
deemed not to be of constitutionalist significance at European level. An uneven 
constitutionalism then emerges, whereby some issues receive sustained attention and are 
developed by means of judicial innovation and others are seemingly marginalised or left 
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largely to states themselves to determine. In many cases these marginalised issues, which 
might be read as being of lesser constitutionalist significance, lie squarely on the borderlines 
between personal, state and regional power, such as abortion. Thus, matters of reproductive 
autonomy are readable as being insignificant to the constitutionalist for they do not seem to 
merit the cost of progressive judicial innovation.  
On our reading of the jurisprudence of the Court, then, uneven constitutionalism 
emerges at least partially from quasi-arithmetic assessments of cost in terms of diffuse 
support that are inherent to judicial self-restraint through the management of judicial 
innovation. While such assessments can be deployed to shore up support on the part of 
contracting parties, they have potentially opposite effects in the case of other stakeholders 
such as NGOs and rights bearers who may begin to lose faith in the Court’s capacity and 
willingness to address the violation of their rights. Although it seems extremely unlikely that 
this would result in a significant reduction in cases brought to the Court for resolution, it may 
be the case that people who can do so will turn increasingly to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU for the resolution of rights violations where EU law is involved
116
 so that 
the Court would find itself less frequently to the forefront of the development of the 
European public order. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Judicial innovation is crucial to the development of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, but this does not mean that it does, can or must be present in every case upon which 
the Court adjudicates. Given the subsidiary and international nature of the Court, 
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constitutionalist development of the Convention through judicial innovation necessarily 
creeps in the European Court of Human Rights. Even then, the speed at which it creeps, the 
areas in which it occurs, and the reaction to same from contracting parties are all matters that 
must be taken into account by the Court when determining the extent to which to be 
innovative in any particular case. In this paper we have argued that some mechanisms of 
managing judicial innovation are, thus, required. We contend that in trying to engage in 
progressive constitutionalism while maintaining the diffuse support of contracting parties the 
ECtHR exercises judicial self-restraint by carefully managing its docket, being cognisant of 
non-legal factors of importance to and within the states, and selectively deploying consensus 
decision-making to determine the speed of change. This can, in some cases, mean that 
outcomes are reached that create an uneven constitutionalism and are somewhat 
unsatisfactory from the perspective of litigants and the human rights community, who tend to 
expect the Court to engage as fully as possible in the advancement and development of rights. 
However, without a somewhat pragmatic and self-restrained approach, the negative 
consequences of judicial innovation and such constitutionalist urges may run the risk of 
undermining states’ support for the Court and would, in turn, be detrimental to the Court in 
trying to maintain its effectiveness in rights protection on a broad scale. As a result, as 
outlined above, our claim is that the Court carefully manages judicial innovation through a 
nascent model of judicial self-restraint. 
This conclusion is not necessarily in accordance with the views of judges and 
lawyers within the Court itself.
117
 When interviewed, Michael O’Boyle, the deputy registrar 
of the Court, for instance, pointed out that 
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I do not think that the Court thinks about the execution of judgments when it 
adopts them. The only thing that the Court has in the back of its mind is what 
the right result is, and that there is a solid basis in the legal reasoning for its 
conclusions. 
118
 
Along similar lines, former judge of the ECtHR Malinverni pointed out that ‘the possibility 
for the state to execute the judgment is not a major argument for us. We try to see only 
whether there is a violation of human rights or not’.119 Judge Garlicki expressed a more 
nuanced position pointing out that the judges try to think realistically about their judgments, 
‘maybe not in a sense of political propaganda; that the judgment should be written in a way 
that will not provoke conflict’.120  
These perspectives from inside the Court might suggest that the management of 
judicial innovation is not explicitly discussed by the members of the court, but that does not 
mean that docket management, cognisance of non-legal factors, and consensus decision-
making are not management mechanisms. When viewed in this light, the continued 
deployment of the Court of these strategies—notwithstanding their possible negative 
implications—can be understood as part of the Court’s larger work in securing effective 
rights protection in spite of its somewhat precarious institutional position.  
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